The minister’s remarks are in a similar vein but more measured than Somalia’s response to a deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia whereby recognition would reportedly be granted in exchange for sea access.

I received late-night calls from Somalis who said they were unable to sleep over the controversial proposal.

Somalia’s then-Environment Minister Aden Ibrahim Aw Hirsi told me at the time: “You are always going on about ‘political bombshells’ in your reporting.

“People here are talking about a political earthquake. This is far more serious. It is a tsunami.”

Turkey has since mediated an end to the feud but the fact that Somalia recently signed a $600,000 (£492,000) a year deal with top Washington lobbying firm, the BGR Group, suggests it is worried about relations with the incoming Trump administration.

The US last month abstained from voting on a UN Security Council resolution, external to fund the latest incarnation of the African Union intervention force in Somalia.

A key architect of Republican Africa thinking, especially when it comes to Somali issues, is Joshua Meservey, who recently moved from the Heritage Foundation to the right-leaning Hudson Institute.

“The case for Somaliland in US terms is very compelling,” he argues. “I think the question of recognition will definitely be discussed, although the guiding north star is what is best for US national interests in practical terms.”

Senior Africa officials under Trump mark one, including the former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Tibor Nagy, and Africa envoy, Peter Pham, are energetic supporters of Somaliland’s independence.

Like many American Republicans, Somaliland’s Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Adan sees the relationship in transactional terms.

“If the deal is good for us, we will take it. If the US wants a military base here we will give it to them.”

Recognition sympathisers argue that Somaliland is located at the site of several converging US interests – economic, military and strategic.

Mr Meservey adds that the territory should be “rewarded” for adhering to democratic principles, not relying on foreign aid and having a small government.

Its long coastline runs along one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.

Yemen’s Iranian-backed Houthi rebels may have replaced Somali pirates as the main disruptor of traffic in the area but the attacks remain a major threat to global trade and draw the region closer to the war in the Middle East.

The scramble for foreign bases along the Horn of Africa’s coast is of concern to the US, which established its largest military facility on the continent in Djibouti in 2002.

Russia has its eyes on Port Sudan; the United Arab Emirates (UAE) used Eritrea’s Assab to fight the Houthis and Djibouti is chock-a-block with foreign forces, including the Chinese, who not only have a well-placed military facility but also run the huge port.

Turkey’s largest base on foreign soil stretches along Somalia’s coastline just south of Mogadishu.

Dealing with a rising China is a top Trump priority.

The US has accused the Chinese of interfering with its activities in Djibouti by shining lasers into the eyes of its air force pilots and is keen to move elsewhere.

It also wants to disrupt China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which is taking over much of Africa.

The Red Sea port of Berbera, whether you see it as part of Somaliland or Somalia, has much to offer as an alternative.

China is not there; indeed it is outraged that Taiwan in 2020 established diplomatic relations with the breakaway republic.

The UAE, a key US ally, runs the recently expanded port and hopes it will rival Djibouti.

During the Biden administration, top American officials, including the chief of US Africa Command (Africom), conducted site visits of Berbera, which has a 4km runway ironically constructed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

This was later identified by the US as an emergency landing site for space shuttles – interesting given Trump’s ally Elon Musk’s obsession with space.

In 2022, the US National Defence Authorisation Act was amended to include Somaliland, enhancing security co-operation and potentially paving the way for stronger diplomatic and economic ties.